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Jack Balkin's Abortion and Original Meaning should be 
widely read and debated, not only by constitutional theorists but 
by a broad range of those who care about his subject: how the 
United States interprets its foundational document. How should 
those who are part of that interpretive enterprise-from federal 
judges to "we the people"-go about the process of defining our 
core constitutional principles and who we are as a nation? And 
how should that interpretive process apply to one of the most 
controversial issues of the day, abortion? 
Constitutional theory, of course, is the subject of an enor-
mous scholarly literature, and others have agreed with Balkin 
that the Constitution is both binding law that requires fidelity 
(over preferred policy outcomes) and "living" in its application 
to changing times. One obvious question for Balkin-and for 
anyone writing in the area-is what he adds to the existing litera-
ture. By standard measures familiar to legal academics, he con-
tributes much: a jurisprudentially strong interpretive theory that 
emphasizes the centrality of original meaning from what can be 
described as a progressive perspective. Fidelity to the Framers 
does not require, as some originalists suggest and some progres-
sives fear, freezing constitutional norms to the narrow original 
expectations of the Framers. Nor does a living Constitution ap-
proach require disregarding the Framers' original meaning. 
This comment, though, explores a more unorthodox and in-
direct contribution: the articulation of a progressive interpretive 
methodology that is not only strong jurisprudentially, but that 
also offers the potential for relatively broad accessibility and po-
litical efficacy, for the Constitution outside the courts and the 
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constitutional influences of social movements. In a working de-
mocracy, constitutional theory has import beyond academia. 
That import is particularly pronounced at a time when influen-
tial elected officials continue a decades-long assault on "activisf' 
judges, with charges that those who protect constitutional rights 
and liberties seek illegitimately to "make" (as in "make up") 
rather than "interpret" law. The nation has special need for 
prominent scholars who can develop and explain principled con-
stitutional theory in popularly accessible and politically effective 
terms. Balkin's prior work establishes his preeminence in this re-
gard, and this latest article brings his abilities to the pressing and 
enduring issues of the role of original meaning and the constitu-
tional status of abortion bans. 
The issues of originalism and abortion illustrate that aca-
demics on the ideological right have excelled at reaching beyond 
academic circles to shape politics and public policy. As Profes-
sors Robert Post and Reva Siegel have recently observed, the 
extensive scholarly criticism of originalism since its rise in the 
1980's, while impressive on its own terms, is incomplete in its in-
attention to the actual terms of originalism's remarkable suc-
cesses.1 The literature exposes the deficiencies of originalism as 
an interpretive methodology, most notably its inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies, and quite convincingly devastates its jurispru-
dential claims. Yet originalism's enormous influence has come 
less as a theory of jurisprudence than as a highly persuasive po-
litical ideology that inspires passionate political engagement. 
The right uses both originalism and abortion to far greater po-
litical advantage than public opinion polls would predict, includ-
ing to impugn the constitutional fidelity of "nonoriginalists" and 
supporters of Roe v. Wade. 2 
Progressives will benefit from Abortion and Original Mean-
ing, whether or not they are steeped in constitutional theory. As 
they read, they will feel their spirits soar and at times will silently 
(perhaps audibly) cheer. They will be empowered as Balkin pro-
vides deepened understanding and improved ways of articulating 
their constitutional views. Balkin eloquently demonstrates that 
progressives, no less than originalists of the traditional stripe, 
care about fidelity to the constitutional text, adherence to consti-
1. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism As A Political Practice: The Right's 
Living Constitution. 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 545 (2006): see generally Dawn Johnsen, Les-
sons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the Twenty-First Century, 1 HARV. 
L. & POL'Y REV. 239 (2007). 
2. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
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tutional principle, and respect for the intent of the Framers of 
that great document. And his approach to original meaning en-
courages belief that the Constitution indeed is a great document, 
susceptible of principled interpretations that promote equality 
and liberty for all. 
Originalists of the traditional stripe from the ideological 
right no doubt will remain unmoved. They will contest Balkin's 
premise that original meaning and living constitutionalism are 
compatible- that originalists have fostered a false dichotomy be-
tween the two by conflating the original meaning of the constitu-
tional text (which Balkin says must constrain interpretation) and 
the text's "original expected application" (endorsed by original-
ists like Justice Antonin Scalia). Originalists certainly will op-
pose Balkin's attempted appropriation of the phrase "original 
meaning." They will disagree especially with Balkin's view of the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion and Privileges or Immunities Clauses as protective of repro-
ductive liberty. Balkin anticipates such responses and notes that, 
to the extent they come, he will have succeeded in structuring 
the debate on appropriate terms. 
Balkin's "text and principle" methodology should be evalu-
ated in comparison with the longer litany of interpretive sources 
and methods that the Court traditionally uses and progressives 
typically endorse. That list includes: text, structure, original 
meaning, original expected application (to use Balkin's phrase), 
judicial doctrine, political branch practice, settled expectations, 
consequences, and the nation's tradition, ethos and values. 3 
Balkin describes his approach more simply: "constitutional in-
terpretation requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Con-
stitution and to the principles that underlie the text. "4 
3. See, e.g .. PHILIP BOBBIIT. COI'STITCTIOI'AL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991) 
(describing six modalities of constitutional argument: historical. textual. structural. doc-
trinal. ethical. and prudential): H. JEFFERSON POWELL. A COMMUNITY BUILT ON 
WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 208 (2002) ("In constitutional 
argument it is legitimate to invoke text. constitutional structure. original meaning. origi-
nal intent. judicial precedent and doctrine. political-branch practice and doctrine. settled 
expectations. the ethos of American constitutionalism. the traditions of our law and our 
people. and the consequences of differing interpretations of the Constitution."): 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITLTIONAL LAW 85 (3rd ed. 2000) (theorizing 
that appropriate modes of constitutional interpretation include "text. structure. historv. 
the nation's values or ethos. and doctrine"). · 
4. Jack Balkin. Abortion and Original Meaning. 24 CO!'<ST. COMMENT. 291. 293 
(2007). Balkin continues. "(t]he task of interpretation is to look to original meaning and 
underlying principle and decide how best to apply them in current circumstances." !d. 
Some principles follow directly from particular text. while others must be inferred from 
the constitutional structure (such as separation of powers and democracy). Fidelity to 
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The disparity between the approaches is not as great as it 
might initially seem, because Balkin would allow appropriate 
consideration of these other sources (including original expected 
application) as aids to interpretation. He would recognize, how-
ever, a hierarchy of methods in that only text and principle (in-
terpreted in light of original meaning) control interpretation and 
are essential to constitutional fidelity. Balkin explains the secon-
dary status of other methods in part by urging that we view citi-
zens, not courts, as the standard interpreters when considering 
what constitutes constitutional fidelity. This point is fundamen-
tal. and in my view accurate. Constitutional interpretation by 
judges raises special institutional considerations, including the 
need for additional interpretive constraints. Thus, courts employ 
a range of doctrinal devices that constrain their authority and 
role, such as deferential standards of review, political question 
doctrine, and standing and other jurisdictional requirements. 
Presidents and Congress also play important interpretive roles, 
though they face their own constraints. In place of the typical 
court focus, Balkin emphasizes the substantial work of social and 
political movements- "the lifeblood of fidelity to our Constitu-
tion''- as "[ e ]ach generation makes the Constitution their Con-
stitution by calling up~)ll its. text a~d its principles and arguing 
about what they mean m the1r own time." 
Balkin's emphasis on text and principle is very appealing, 
and debate about its relative merits will surely advance constitu-
tional theory. For now, I want to return to Post and Siegel's ob-
servation that originalism has succeeded primarily as a political 
ideology that has motivated political engagement and action. 
Progressives. too, must consider the political viability of how 
they respond to originalism and how they articulate their pre-
ferred interpretive methodology. On this score, "text and princi-
ple'' shows promise. The longer standard litany of sources and 
methods to my mind is clearly correct and within the jurispru-
dential mainstream. With a nonexpert audience, though, it risks 
creating the (mis)impression of inappropriate indeterminacy and 
unprincipled discretion left to the interpreter, who can pick and 
text requires consideration of principle as well because. although some constitutional text 
is relatively concrete and specific. other text describes relatively abstract and general 
concepts. Balkin's approach is consistent with the relatively familiar argument that when 
the Framers chose to use text that describes abstract and general concepts. they typically 
sought to embody abstract and general principles that must be fleshed out by later gen-
erations. 
5. !d. at 302. 301. 
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choose to suit desired ends- and, in the case of conflict, even 
disregard text and principle. 
By emphasizing which among the methods are essential to 
constitutional fidelity and affirming the centrality of original 
meaning (properly defined), Balkin reclaims for progressives 
both the document and the Framers. Progressive interpretive 
theory arguably cannot succeed-and should not succeed-
either jurisprudentially or politically unless it in some measure 
acknowledges the primacy of the text and the relevance of origi-
nal meaning. 
Balkin's popularly accessible narrative is not only politically 
viable, but potentially politically superior to originalism. Justice 
Scalia, like many originalists, tolerates for the sake of stability 
some decisions that he believes the Court as an initial matter de-
cided incorrectly by failing to adhere to the original expected 
application. Balkin explains that this frequent need to resort to 
stare decisis reveals a fatal inadequacy of originalism: 
Our political tradition does not regard decisions that have se-
cured equal rights for women, greater freedom of speech, fed-
eral power to protect the environment. and federal power to 
pass civil rights laws as mistakes that we must unhappily re-
tain; it regards them as genuine achievements of American 
constitutionalism and sources of pride. These decisions are 
part of how and why we understand ourselves to be a nation 
that has grown freer and more democratic over time. No in-
terpretive theory that regards equal constitutional rights for 
women as an unfortunate blunder ... can be adequate to our 
history as a people." 
This is but one of many statements in Abortion and Original 
Meaning that will cause progressive readers, beaten down from 
years of rhetoric about illegitimate judicial activism, enthusiasti-
cally to jot in the margins, and think "this is the America I know 
and love." Under Balkin's theory, revered judicial rulings that 
protect cherished rights and expand political inclusion for those 
previously disfavored were correct when issued and are consis-
tent with original meaning. They should be celebrated as Ameri-
can constitutionalism at its best, not excused as unfortunate but 
sturdy precedents. 
The article's promise for political influence is enhanced by 
its application of the "text and principle'' approach to Roe v. 
6. !d. at 298-99. 
422 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:417 
Wade and the constitutional status of abortion, originalists' most 
frequent target. Even many self-described progressives and lib-
erals find Roe difficult to defend. As in the case of originalism, 
constitutional arguments about the government's authority to 
restrict abortion have reached beyond academia, far more than 
the vast majority of constitutional issues, to have profound po-
litical impact. As Supreme Court cases go, Roe is widely recog-
nized and debated. Scholars are joined by anti-abortion advo-
cates and elected officials in relentless attacks that claim the 
right to privacy is unsupported by either the constitutional text 
or the Framers' intent-and that those who disagree are unprin-
cipled, anti-democratic judicial activists. 
Balkin's compelling account of why what he terms the 
"conventional wisdom" on Roe is wrong will inspire and em-
power supporters of Roe and legal abortion, who desperately 
need improved articulations of the right that can persuade not 
only (or primarily) courts but also political actors and ultimately 
the public. Unlike Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey,7 in which the Court eloquently described the na-
ture of the right at stake but rested as well on arguments from 
stare decisis, Balkin provides an entirely affirmative account of 
why the original meaning of the Constitution is best interpreted 
as affording women protection from abortion bans. He explains 
why Roe is best viewed as entirely faithful to constitutional "text 
and principle." 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not use the 
word "privacy" (a point Roe opponents repeat ad nauseam), it 
does speak of "liberty" in the Due Process Clause, which the 
Court has interpreted as protecting private decision-making re-
garding childbearing. Balkin personally finds greater protection 
for the right to choose abortion in the original meaning of the 
Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities, and Equal Protection 
Clauses. Those clauses, which on his reading the Court has mis-
interpreted and underenforced, guarantee a right of equal citi-
zenship that prohibits the state from subordinating women or as-
signing them second-class status based on their capacity to 
become pregnant. For some contemporary, especially non-legal, 
audiences, this emphasis on women's equality and sexual subor-
dination will not directly translate into political messages as per-
suasive as the traditional focus on privacy and individual liberty. 
But Balkin's discussion of alternative sources of the abortion 
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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right and how the Court came to locate it in the Due Process 
Clause helps provide a more complete and accurate picture of 
the nature of the right and its import to women- a picture of the 
right, moreover, that is grounded in the politically powerful and 
legitimizing language of text and original meaning.8 
I do question one aspect of Balkin's analysis: his suggestion 
that we should view the abortion right as two separate rights. 
Other commentators, including Supreme Court Justices, have 
considered the right in its component parts.9 That exercise can 
prove extremely useful. The particular division Balkin endorses, 
though, seems to me theoretically incomplete and possibly po-
litically and practically inadequate. His first right, "a woman's 
right not to be forced by the state to bear children at risk to her 
life or health," essentially tracks the Court's consistent recogni-
tion to date, from Roe to Casey to Stenberg, 10 that the govern-
ment may not impose on women significant threats to their 
health. A woman therefore must be permitted to terminate a 
pregnancy at any point, even after fetal viability, if her health is 
endangered. This aspect of the right does seem valuable to iso-
late- for courts, for legislatures, and for public opinion. 
Balkin describes the second right as "a woman's right to de-
cide whether or not to become a mother and assume the obliga-
tions of parenthood." He would have the courts protect this right 
against state-enforced motherhood only for a limited period of 
pregnancy: "it requires only that women have a reasonable time 
to decide whether to become mothers and have a fair and realis-
tic opportunity to make that choice." 
Lost in this division is a complete sense of the physical in-
trusion that abortion bans inflict on women's bodily integrity. 
The first right does reflect an aspect of bodily integrity but is lim-
8. This analysis is valuable beyond abortion as a case study that illustrates the 
general nature of judicial doctrine. including doctrine's inherent limitations and its dis-
tinctiveness from the document. 
9. For example. Justice Harry Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part 
in Casey. described the following two ways in which abortion restrictions violate women's 
constitutional rights: "First. compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a 
woman's right to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and signifi-
cant risks of physical harm." 505 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part. and dissenting in part). "Further. when the State restricts a woman's right to termi-
nate her pregnancy. it deprives a woman of the right to make her own decision about re-
production and family planning-critical life choices .... Because motherhood has a 
dramatic impact on a woman's educational prospects. employment opportunities. and 
self-determination. restrictive abortion laws deprive her of basic control over her life." 
/d. at 927-28. 
10. Stenberg v. Carhart. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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ited to specific threats to a woman's health or life beyond the 
standard threats that accompany pregnancy and childbirth-for 
example where a pregnant woman develops cancer. The second 
right deals with parenthood and the "life-altering set of respon-
sibilities that come with being a parent," responsibilities that 
pertain equally when a child is adopted. This right would protect 
against a government effort to force women (or men) to adopt 
children in need of homes, or possibly even to take in foster 
children in need of emergency care. It does not, however, cap-
ture the physical and psychological harms inflicted on women by 
government-mandated pregnancy and childbearing, including 
the significant health risks that accompany even "normal" preg-
nancies. 
A more complete conception of this second right, one that 
reflects the intrusion on women's bodily integrity as well as the 
life-altering social responsibilities, I think also suggests that the 
right is best understood as existing for the entire duration of 
pregnancy rather than only for a reasonable time in which to 
make a decision. The right exists throughout pregnancy, but a 
separate question remains whether the government possesses an 
adequate justification for overriding that right. Balkin and I es-
sentially end up at the same bottom line, though. I think that the 
Court in Roe and Casey dealt well with the government's com-
peting interest in protecting fetal life by allowing abortion bans 
(with health exceptions) after the point of fetal viability. Balkin's 
formulation is helpful in thinking about how this balance is 
struck, because the viability line does allow women a reasonable 
time to decide whether to accept. indeed in many cases to wel-
come, the bodily changes and also the future parenting obliga-
tions.11 Balkin would prefer a "discourse shaping'' approach that 
leaves greater room for legislative involvement in selecting the 
point in pregnancy after which abortion would be illegal. Al-
though I see the theoretical appeal in this alternative (especially 
if the Court had adopted it back in 1973), I have serious con-
cerns about moving to this approach decades later. In the end 
Balkin agrees that, at this point in the doctrinal development, it 
is best to stick with the viability line. 
The principal potential inadequacy I see in the way Balkin 
presents his two rights is that he considers only laws that would 
11. Cf Casey. 505 U.S. at 870 ( .. The viability line also has. as a practical matter. an 
element of fairness. In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act 
before viability has consented to the State"s intervention on behalf of the developing 
child ... ). 
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ban abortion, and not the literally hundreds of state laws that 
impose a myriad of obstacles and restrictions on women and 
abortion providers. Anti-abortion legislators and advocates hope 
such laws will ultimately render their states, and ultimately the 
nation, "abortion free" just as effectively as would an abortion 
ban. Indeed, the strategy is working: as of 2007, in three states, 
only one abortion provider remains, and nationwide the number 
of providers has been steadily declining since 1973.12 Balkin does 
acknowledge the existence of some restrictive abortion laws 
short of bans-namely, mandatory waiting periods and parental 
consent requirements-not to assess their constitutionality, but 
only in the context of considering what would be a reasonable 
period after which a state could criminalize abortion in accor-
dance with his second right. By Balkin's own. possibly overly op-
timistic, estimation, even if the Court were to overrule Roe ex-
pressly and completely, only up to a dozen states would outlaw 
abortion. Balkin's analysis, I think, would be more theoretically 
complete and practically helpful if it was expanded to address as 
well the types of abortion restrictions that are most threatening 
to women today, and that would remain most threatening in 
most states even if the Court were to overrule Roe and uphold 
abortion bans. 
As this discussion of Balkin's abortion analysis illustrates. 
"text and principle" leaves substantial room for disagreement 
about its application to particular issues, even among progres-
sives. That indeterminacy may lead to charges of jurisprudential 
and political inadequacy. Balkin doesn't purport to resolve all 
applications, and far more than a persuasive interpretive meth-
odology is needed for ultimate political success. He does, 
though, seek to structure debate. Some progressives will ques-
tion whether such indeterminacy is best debated on grounds ini-
tially staked out by, and now closely associated with, ideological 
conservatives-to my mind, a close question. Post and Siegel, for 
example, caution progressives who would embrace a version of 
originalism, and warn against "a method of interpretation that 
strongly privileges the history of constitutional lawmaking over 
the experience of living under the Constitution. "13 Whether or 
12. Some of the most insidious examples are described by abortion advocates as 
"TRAP" laws. for "targeted regulation of abortion providers ... Under the guise of rea-
sonable-sounding. but medically unnecessary. health regulations. states require ex-
tremely expensive remodeling of abortion clinics. regulations that essentially require the 
building of small hospitals and as a practical matter result in the closing of clinics. 
13. Robert Post & Reva Siegel. How Liberals Need ro Approach Consriwrional 
Theory. THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE. Sept. 18. 2007. 
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not one ultimately finds Balkin's precise formulation convincing, 
it powerfully highlights essential aspects of a successful interpre-
tive methodology. 
In emphasizing the potential political and public policy 
value of Abortion and Original Meaning, I do not denigrate its 
inherent value or interest to the more traditional law review au-
dience, among whom it was widely read and well regarded even 
while in draft form. I do seek to encourage that audience to con-
sider more intentionally the potential impact of this and other 
scholarship beyond academia. Progress and even transformation 
on policy matters related to constitutional interpretation clearly 
can be aided by academic scholarship, as evidenced by the ideo-
logical right's successes on these very issues of originalism and 
abortion. Abortion and Original Meaning should be widely read 
and also summarized and translated-for it is quite long-to 
reach even broader audiences. It has the potential to help un-
mask the hypocrisy behind vacuous sound bites such as "strict 
constructionist" and "judicial activist"- and to advance popular 
understanding of how we should determine constitutional mean-
ing. Fidelity to "text and principle." consistent with original 
meaning (properly defined). is one appropriate and appealing 
basis on which to debate progressive constitutionalism. 
